GETTING TO ENOUGH

HOW WE'LL SOLVE THE DILEMMA THAT'S DESTROYING OUR WORLD

Thomas Homer-Dixon October 7, 2023



The problem:

"Anyone who grasps the severity of humanity's predicament and tries to figure out how we might respond with something like a new organization, technology, or social movement to make things better—not just for ourselves narrowly, but for all of humanity—confronts an unforgiving conundrum, which I've come to call the *enough vs. feasible dilemma*."

Thomas Homer-Dixon, Commanding Hope: The Power We Have to Renew a World in Peril (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2020), p. 35.

The problem (continued):

"On one hand, changes that would be **enough** to make a real difference—that would genuinely reduce the danger humanity faces if they were implemented—don't appear to be **feasible**, in the sense that our societies aren't likely to implement them, because of existing political, economic, social, or technological roadblocks.

On the other hand, changes that do currently appear *feasible* won't be *enough*."

Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Commanding Hope: The Power We Have to Renew a World in Peril* (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2020), p. 35.

Feasibility (and number) of interventions

Effectiveness
(and systemic disruptiveness)
of interventions

We can graph the enough vs. feasible dilemma, by plotting an intervention's effectiveness (say, in keeping warming to 2°) against its feasibility. We appear to live in a world where the relationship looks like this.

Feasibility (and number) of interventions

Effectiveness
(and systemic disruptiveness)
of interventions

More **feasible** interventions are easier to implement, so we implement more of them. *More effective interventions generally* involve more disruption to our societies' worldviews, institutions, and technologies. People and organizations resist this disruption, so these interventions are less feasible, and we implement fewer of them.


Feasibility (and number) of interventions


Effectiveness

(and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

The area under the curve corresponds to the **total potential effectiveness** of all feasible interventions in our current world.

It's not enough.





Effectiveness

(and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

Not enough

Effectiveness (and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

But perhaps we're missing something.

Feasibility (and number) of interventions

Interventions in the adjacent possible

Feasibility

(and number)


of interventions

Effectiveness

(and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

Perhaps additional
effective interventions lie
beyond the boundary of
what we currently
recognize as possible—in
a zone called the
"adjacent possible."

Feasibility
(and number)
of interventions



Effectiveness

(and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

These currently
unrecognized
interventions will become
possible as societies—
their worldviews,
institutions, and
technologies—reconfigure
themselves in response to
today's converging
environmental, economic,
social, and technological
stresses.

Perhaps enough, when combined

Feasibility (and number) of interventions

Effectiveness

(and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

And together, those newly feasible interventions, along with the ones we're implementing today, may be enough.

these interventions in the We focus here **Effectiveness** (and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions

The Cascade Institute's

mandate is to identify

adjacent possible and

make them real.

Feasibility (and number) of interventions

Feasibility

(and number)


of interventions

But why does feasibility fall to zero at the midrange of effectiveness?


Let's turn the curve upside down to see.

Effectiveness


(and systemic disruptiveness) of interventions



Effectiveness
(and systemic disruptiveness)
of interventions




By flipping the curve upside down, we've shifted our focus from the feasibility and effectiveness of solutions within society to the changing states of society itself.



The bottom axis still represents disruption. But now, instead of the degree of disruption induced by a discrete intervention, it's the total disruption of society by all destabilizing forces.


The further right on the axis, the more our society's configurations of worldviews, institutions, and technologies differ from configurations today.

(difference from current social configuration)




The left axis now represents societal instability, rising from bottom to top.

The closer to the top, the more unstable are our society's configurations. (Technically, this means they're more susceptible to nonlinear change, so a small push can cause an enormous response).




The curve is an example of what complexity scientists call a "stability landscape."


Complexity scientists use stability landscapes to understand how complex systems like an economy or Earth's climate move between stable states, or "equilibria."



A system's overall state is represented by a ball on the landscape. The ball rolls towards a low point, or "basin of attraction," where it's more stable.




Our societies are currently in a basin on the left side.
But multiple crises, like pandemics, war, economic crisis, and extreme climate events, are disrupting them and propelling them up the basin's side.




And because we aren't effectively intervening to reduce the stresses driving these crises—that is, because we aren't "getting to enough"—they're becoming steadily more severe.

So the degree of "Disruption" our societies are experiencing is rising with the passage of time from the present into the future.




The Institute's "Global Polycrisis" project is working to identify the factors driving our societies out of their current basin of attraction, especially those factors contributing to the synchronization of crises across global systems.





Beyond a certain level of disruption, our societies' worldviews, institutions, and technologies will "flip" to a new stable state, a new basin of attraction. (The zone at the top of the hump represents a period of extreme instability between the two states.)

This reconfiguration could allow for much more effective interventions, as shown in the earlier slides.




But we'll achieve this positive outcome only if we don't end up at each others' throats. As our societies face converging stresses and multiple crises, the degree to which human beings recognize their shared fate on Earth will largely determine whether we fight each other or collaborate to solve our common problems.






But there's still more to this story.


This curve represents a two-dimensional "slice" through a three-dimensional energy landscape—a landscape that reveals the choice humanity faces between good and terrible futures.




It looks something like this.




The previous
curve is shown
superimposed on
the landscape. It
runs left to right
through the
lowest points of
the two front
basins.




Imagine a knife slicing through the landscape along the red line. The front edge of the landscape would then have the same shape as the curve.




As we see here.




The dimension along the front of this three-dimensional landscape remains "Disruption."




The dimension along the left side is new. It represents "Disintegration," or decreasing social cohesion, including loss of interpersonal and intergroup trust, loss of normative consensus across groups, institutional breakdown, and increasing interpersonal and intergroup violence.




The vertical dimension is again "Instability."




Disruption, disintegration, and instability are three causally distinct variables. So it's quite possible to have a situation of stable disintegration, as represented by the larger basin of attraction at the back.



Humanity is currently in the basin at the front lower left, but stresses and shocks of various kinds (and a long-term shallowing of the basin) mean we're being almost certain to be knocked out of this stability zone in the next decades.




Our two alternative futures are the "Mad Max" and "Renew the Future" basins, as described in chapter 20 of Commanding Hope.



Mad Max represents a future of wholesale loss of institutional stability and social cohesion. Think of the mess in Haiti today writ globally.


This basin is broad and deep. It represents stable disintegration. If humanity falls into Mad Max, that's likely where we're going to stay.

It's also relatively close; a moderate amount of social disruption, exploited by opportunistic actors, could propel us there.



current social configuration)

The Renew the Future basin offers a possible socially cohesive alternative, but the basin is shallower and its watershed smaller. It's harder to reach, because getting there entails a more profound reconfiguration of our worldviews, institutions, and technologies (i.e., a greater level of disruption). Also, since it's less stable, it's more demanding. We'll have to work hard to stay there.



The path to the Renew the
Future basin would be a
process I've called
"catagenesis," or renewal
through crisis and guided
system transformation
(described in chapter 11 of
The Upside of Down).

It could get us to enough.

Thanks to:

Joe MacInnis, for suggesting I try a 3D representation;

Ruben Nelson, for advice on basin positioning;

Bentley Allan, for pointing out a flaw in the argument's logic;

Mike Lawrence, for helping me turn incomprehensible scribbles on a white board into a working 3D illustration; and,

Chris Carignan, for his brilliant work with SciLab to represent the detailed 3D landscape.